Second Corinth

Second Corinth, wargame played 12/7/18 based on Day 1 of the Second Battle of Corinth, October 3, 1862

October 3, 1862 broke gray as the noncoms kicked and prodded the soldiers of Rosecrans’ Army of the Mississippi. Orders had come to move out of their entrenchments near the railroad junction of Corinth, Mississippi and meet the invading Confederate Army of West Tennessee under General Earl Van Dorn. A hasty breakfast of hardtack and cold bacon – the lucky ones got the dregs of coffee from the sentries – and off they marched, north into the wet, open woods, and scattered hardscrabble farms toward Dawson Creek and the old Confederate works.

The Confederates had been in motion since early morning, skirmishing with Union cavalry pickets and marching south along the Chewalla Road. Just north of Dawson Creek they deployed, Mansfield Lovell on the far western flank with Dabney Maury next, then Martin Green’s division.

Union deployment was a bit offset from the Confederates with Thomas McKean’s division on their far western flank but overlapped by Lovell further to the west, then Thomas Davies’ division, and finally, the cavalry division of John K. Mizner, beyond Green’s flank to the east. Unfortunately for both sides, neither took advantage of their flanking position. Mizner was paralyzed by the idea that John K. Jackson’s rebel cavalry brigade could be even further east and Mansfield Lovell, inexplicably, failed to urge his men on with any sort of vigor.

McKean reached the creek first and immediately dressed his lines and steadied his mostly veteran command into place. John McArthur’s brigade held the left, in the air as it were. In McKean’s center was John Oliver’s brigade and the right and reserve were the veteran Iowans of Marcellus Crocker. The line was ably supported by three batteries of Napoleons, 16 cannon in all.

Davies was still 600 yards from the creek when the ball opened, with Silas Baldwin’s brigade on his left, Richard Oglesby on the left, and Pleasant Hackleman’s brigade in support. Davies also had three batteries, all rifles, 12 guns in all.

On the Confederate right (west) Dabney Maury’s division of veterans came crashing through the woods with Charles Phifer’s brigade of dismounted Texas cavalry on the far right, expecting Lovell to cover their flank, and William Cabell’s Arkansas brigade on the left. John Moore’s brigade was in support. Rapley’s Battery of rifles and McNally’s Battery of Napoleons supported the assault.

The Confederate left, Martin Green’s division, was under the watchful eye of Sterling Price, “Old Pap”, with Earl Van Dorn, the overall commander, observing from Price’s side.  Green advanced with Elijah Gates’ brigade of Missouri veterans on the right, Bruce Colbert’s brigade in the center and the Mississippi brigade of John D. Martin on the far left (west). Martin’s brigade had ignominiously run at the recent battle of Iuka and were held in low regard by the army. Deployed in support was William Moore’s brigade. Dawson’s Battery and Wade’s Battery, both of Napoleons, supported the main attack.

Maury developed his attack with precision and deliberation, bringing steady, intense pressure to bear on the bluecoats. Stirman’s Battalion of sharpshooters took first blood then the 3^rd Arkansas (dismounted) charged over the creek, the 21^st Missouri suffering 40% losses to the withering assault. A bit further along the line, the 18^th Wisconsin was forced back after a similar 40% loss, surrendering their bloodied ground to the 21^st Arkansas.

But it was not all glory for Maury, as the 6^th Texas (dismounted) suffered mightily from repeated blasts of double canister from the Napoleons of Battery F, Illinois Light Artillery and Rapley’s Battery was forced to withdraw one section due to losses to the crews from the heavy fire of the 18^th Missouri (Union).

In all Maury suffered 443 killed, wounded and missing, McKean roughly twice that.

Green and Davies raced each other to the creek and, especially to the small farm of Cyrus Burton. Burton’s small 10-acre spread was surrounded by a stout stone wall and it was this small open space and its surrounding wall and rough-hewn buildings where the hardest fighting of the day was to occur.

Gates threw the 16^th Arkansas at the farm and Colbert supported the attack with the 14^th Arkansas and Dawson’s Battery. Baldwin countered with the 14^th Missouri (Birge’s Sharpshooters) and the 57^th Illinois. The bluecoats got to the farm first but the extra weight of the cannons, in the end, won the day. 225 Confederates and 190 Federals fell in the small farm.

In the center, just west of the farm, at the only bridge over the creek (though it was low enough to walk over at all points) both armies threw their reserves. Crocker’s veteran Iowa troops blocked the road for the Yankees while elements of Gates’ and Cabell’s brigades attacked. Behind the front piles up the Confederate brigade of William Moore and the Union brigade of Pleasant Hackleman. No decision was made here. The Union was forced to withdraw based on Maury’s attack and the events on the far eastern flank.

There, Martin’s disgraced Mississippians and the 37^th Alabama angled into the air where Mizner was supposed to be. Hackleman tried to slow the rebels by deploying Battery D, Missouri Light Artillery but the Alabamians and the 38^th Mississippi advanced relentlessly, capturing two guns. In desperation, and in contradiction of his orders to support Baldwin, Hackleman redeployed the 2^nd and 7^th Iowa, but by the time they arrived it was too late, and Martin threatened to cut the Federal route back to Corinth.

Rosecrans ordered a general withdrawal to the inner works which was done in good order, as losses in Davies division, except at the Burton Farm, had been relatively light.

Van Dorn clapped Price on the back as the Federals pulled back and congratulated him on a “brilliant victory” and ordered the troops stop for dinner. The next day, Van Dorn hurled the same troops at Rosecrans’ works with another two Federal divisions joining their comrades. Again Lovell would fail to attack aggressively and the Confederates would be forced to ignominiously retreat back across the Mississippi, never to again cross east.

We use Mr. Lincoln's War for rules and 15mm figures.

Wargaming Scenarios for the Retreat from Concord

The retreat from Concord provides many sharp little scenarios for skirmish combat. My club uses A Continent in the Balance rules for skirmish actions in this period.

At “The Bloody Angle”, the road from Concord to Boston, generally running west to east, takes a hard turn to the left. The road was bounded by light split-rail fences and the terrain being lightly wooded pasturage with some rock outcroppings. The Woburn militia were set on the southeast corner waiting for the British column under the light cover while parts of several other companies took up positions to the northwest. Here the British ran the gauntlet, not deploying flankers but simply marching past, the light infantry on either side of the main column returning fire haphazardly as they marched through at the double-quick (road column).

Woburn militia - 10 figures, militia, start the game 10-12 inches from the road in cover.

Other militia – 2x8 figures, militia, start 15 inches from the road, each company has a crack shot figure.

British – column 36 grenadiers, in road column, flanked by 16 light infantry on each side, 3 mounted officers, fire discipline, drilled.

At Parker’s Revenge one gets a series of three small hills to the north of the road. Here the British did send flankers to clear the hills. The terrain is lightly wooded farms, on the table spaces of light woods broken up by tilled fields. In April 1775 there was plenty of mud and swampy ground. As the column proceeds on the road, which runs relatively straight, militia companies show themselves on each of three successive hills. The column then detaches some light infantry companies to advance up the hills and chase the militia away.

Place the militia about 10-12 inches from the road on three hills each about a foot apart. Each hill is occupied by a company of 8-12 figures, militia, each with a crack shot figure. The British would have 3x6 figure light infantry companies, drilled, fire discipline, with a mounted officer.

In Menotomy we get a little taste of what passed for urban fighting. Have a small cluster of buildings, maybe two full houses, or a house and a barn, and some smaller buildings with a couple of stout stone walls, and maybe some other obstacles, such as an abandoned wagon. Defending this cluster should be a couple companies of militia (2x10, militia). Send 3 British line companies (3x6, drilled, fire discipline) against them. You may add a 3-pounder cannon to the British if desired.

All three scenarios will play quickly; one could play all three in a single evening. If you play any or all of them drop a comment; we’d love to hear from you (and a photo!). Also, please drop a note with your preferred rules if you play this scale and era often. Good gaming!

The Battles of Lexington and Concord

A brief overview with recommendations for further reading at the end. Suggestions for wargames will follow in subsequent posts.

Dissent, discontent, unrest had been growing in the Thirteen American Colonies of Great Britain, at least in earnest, since the close of hostilities in the French and Indian War in 1763. The chief driving force was various attempts by the Mother Country to impose levies on the colonies to help defray the costs associated with defending them – be it from the French and Spanish, or from the natives who were being steadily pushed out of their own lands by the Europeans.

This discontent finally boiled over into actual armed conflict on April 19, 1775 when a British column was ordered out of Boston in an attempt to seize the two rebel (or Patriot, depending on your point of view) leaders John Hancock and Samuel Adams, who were in Lexington, Massachusetts, and a stash of arms and gunpowder that the rebels has established in Concord, Massachusetts.

The British military governor, General Thomas Gage ordered Lieutenant Colonel Francis Smith to take ten light infantry companies under Major John  Pitcairn (320 men, being the companies from the 4th, 5th, 10th, 23rd, 38th, 43rd, 47th, 52nd, and 59^th Regiments of Foot and the Marine Battalion) and 11 grenadier companies under Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin Bernard (350 men, being the companies of the 4th, 5th, 10th, 18^th, 23rd, 38th, 43rd, 47th, 52nd, and 59^th Regiments of Foot and the Marine Battalion).

The British expedition was characterized by haphazard management from the beginning. The rebels knew of Smith’s destination before he did. Despite Gage sending out a patrol to keep the alarm from being given, rebel messengers (Charles Dawes and Paul Revere) were well on their way before the patrol could stop them. Although the troops were awakened at 9pm on the 18^th for their expedition, the operation of loading their naval barges to cross the Charles River from Boston Common to Lechmere Point in Cambridge was poorly organized and they did not set off on their march until 2am, wet from disembarking in waist-deep water.

It was clear to the British, as they marched through Menotomy (now Arlington), only an hour from setting out, that the alarm had been raised. At 3 am Smith ordered Pitcairn to lead a flying column of 6 light infantry companies on ahead. An hour later, he sent a messenger back to Boston asking for reinforcements.

At Lexington the local “training band” or militia had gathered on the town green, about 80 men under the command of Captain John Parker. Parker apparently desired only to give a show of resistance, of disapproval, but did not intend to fight. The militia were assembled in plain sight and not in combat formation. They did not block the road to Concord, which, Parker knew, was the British goal.

Due to miscommunication, and apprehension however, the British column confronted the militia. 

About 5 am the lead three companies under Marine Lieutenant Jesse Adair arrived in Lexington, and, instead of marching past the militia, turned to face them. Pitcairn deployed the trailing three companies in support and ordered the militia to disperse. By mot accounts they had begun to do just that when a shot rang out. One of the mysteries is who fired it, but the result was the British let loose volley without orders and then charged the militia with bayonets. Only with some difficulty did the British officer regain control. The surviving militia dispersed.

At least two militiamen fired back in the confusion but the “battle” was over in only a few minutes. Eight militiamen were killed and ten wounded. Only a single British soldier was lightly wounded.

The British continued their march until about 1.5 miles from Concord when they encountered the assembled militias of Lincoln and Concord. Colonel James Barrett, however, knowing of the fight at Lexington and the size of the British column, prudently withdrew at a safe distance, back through Concord and over the North Bridge to a hill about a mile north of the town.

More militia continued to arrive, swelling to about 400. Meanwhile Smith had split his command into small parties to carry out Gage’s orders and find the munitions and supplies the rebels had secreted away. They did manage to find three massive 24-pounder cannon, 550 pounds of musket balls, nearly a hundred barrels of flour and salted pork, and several gun carriages. They broke the trunnions of the cannon, making them unusable, threw the musket balls and foodstuffs into the mill pond and burned the gun carriages.

Unfortunately, the burning gun carriages set alight the meetinghouse. Local citizens convinced the British to help with a bucket brigade to save the building. However, Barrett, seeing the smoke rising from the village, decided to advance on the small detachment guarding the North Bridge, about 100 light infantrymen commanded by Captain Walter Laurie.

The militia advanced in column, the Concord River being swollen by the spring rains. Captain Laurie then ordered his men to form column for street firing. A few random shots rang out, probably shots trying to alert their brethren in the village that they needed help. Then a ragged volley, still without orders to fire. Two militiamen, at the head of the column fell dead at this volley and, as the British continued to fire, at least four more fell. Major John Buttrick, leading the advance, ordered the militia to fire.

This volley cut into the disorganized British with devastating effect as half of the British officers and NCOs were hit and at least 12 privates. The British broke and ran, abandoning their wounded. Stunned at their success, the militia split into two defensive positions. Barrett led one group back to the hill to the north of the river while Major Buttrick occupied another hill across the river and up from the road.

Smith now recalled his various search parties, gave his men lunch, and started back to Boston about noon. Materially the only effect of his raid was to destroy the cannon and the gun carriages. The rebels later recovered most of the food and musket balls unharmed from the mill pond.

The militia from all the surrounding towns were now converging on the road back to Boston. From the moment the British column set out the militia had taken random ineffectual shots at the retreating column. But, at Meriam’s Corner, a crossroads about a mile east of Concord, the British rear guard turned to offer a volley. The militia, now closer, replied. No rebels were hit but the first British casualties of the retreat fell – two killed and six more wounded.

Another mile on, at Brooks’ Hill, Smith sent his lead companies up the hill to chase away the militiamen. The regulars were met by determined fire and were forced to withdraw. At one choke point after another the British were caught by the militias. At each point the British light infantry would try to push the militia away from the line of march. Sometimes the rebels would fall back, other times it would be the regulars. At the boundary of Lincoln and Lexington, Lt. Col. Smith was hit in the thigh and unhorsed. A bit later Major Pitcairn’s horse bolted, throwing him to the ground and injuring his arm.

By 2:30 only one British officer was uninjured. The column was saved from complete destruction by the arrival of a relief column of 1,000 men (the line companies of the 4^th, 23^rd, and 47^th Regiments of Foot and the Marine Battalion) under the command of Brigadier General Hugh, Earl Percy. The relief column had been formed when Smith’s request for reinforcements had arrived about 5 am. However, as with the first expedition, the organization of the relief was fraught with incompetence and did not get on the march until 8:45 am. Percy took only the standard load of ammunition for his column, 36 rounds, and, though he did take two battalion guns, 3-pounders, he did not bring any extra ammunition for them either.

Gage did send two ammunition wagons after Percy’s column but they were intercepted by a band of overage militia. When the wagons attempted to drive past, the militia opened fire and killed two, wounded their officer and captured 6 men and both wagons.

Percy set up a perimeter and allowed Smith’s battered column to rest and have the wounded tended to at Munroe’s Tavern in Lexington. At 3:30 they set out again for Boston, Smith’s survivors sheltered in the middle with Percy’s troops deployed in a protective screen in all directions.  General William Heath had arrived during this halt to take overall command of the Minutemen.

The fighting became intense at Menotomy, the British trying to clear houses and fence lines and, occasionally, innocent people were killed. The militia suffered 25 killed in the fighting in Menotomy while the British lost about 40 killed and another 80 wounded.

Percy now swung his column away from Boston Neck and toward Charlestown. This change of route caught Heath’s men off-guard and an approaching company from Marblehead and Salem under Colonel Thomas Pickering allowed the British to pass unscathed. As darkness gathered, the exhausted survivors took up a strong defensive position in the Charlestown hills under the protective guns of the HMS Somerset, a ship of the line.

By the next day the army of militia surrounding Boston had grown to 15,000 and Major General Artemas Ward had taken command from Heath. The colonies were in revolt.

Further Reading (click on the title to go to Biblio.com, if you are interested, for available copies of the book):

History of the Siege of Boston and the Battles of Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill by Richard Frothingham, Jr. is one of the first in-depth studies of the battle. Mr. Frothingham was the editor of the Boston Post, an historian of some note for the time, and a politician, serving as mayor of Charlestown and a member of the Massachusetts House of Representatives.

Lexington and Concord by Richard B. Tourtellot is a comprehensive study of the battles and the events leading up to them. Published originally in 1959 it is an excellent source still.

Battle Road by Charles H. Bradford was published as a commemorative history for the bicentennial. It is a simple history, intended to give an outline for the large crowds expected for the bicentennial. It was the first book I read on the battles and is still an excellent introduction, especially for young readers.
A Single Blow: the Battles of Lexington and Concord by Philip S. Greenwalt and Robert Orrison is a recent (2018) military history of the battles. It is a volume in the excellent Emerging Revolutionary War Series.

Slemmer saves Fort Pickens for the Union

On 20 December 1860 South Carolina passed an ordinance of secession. In short order Mississippi (January 9, 1861), Florida (January 10, 1861), Alabama (January 11, 1861), Georgia (January 19, 1861), Louisiana (January 26, 1861) and Texas (February 1, 1861) also seceded. Each seceding state demanded the surrender of the various United States military installations and all their armaments. In Pensacola Harbor were three such installations, the unoccupied but primary defensive post of Fort Pickens, the army Barrancas Barracks, and the Pensacola Navy Yard.

Fort Pickens (from Battles and Leaders)

The army garrison, at Barrancas Barracks, consisted of Company G, First Artillery, under the command of Lieutenant Adam J. Slemmer. The Navy Yard, with the steamers Wyandotte and Supply, a handful of marines and shore personnel, was under the command of Commodore James Armstrong.

Lieutenant Slemmer, seeing the political winds, had taken steps to ensure the government property in his charge, including gunpowder and many heavy cannon, did not fall into the hands of the secessionists. While Commodore Armstrong vacillated, Slemmer acted. On the 8^th of January he had moved all the gunpowder from its exposed magazine and placed a regular guard on his facility.

These actions were immediately tested when a party of twenty civilians came with the apparent intent of occupying the barracks. The corporal of the guard raised the alarm and the civilians withdrew.  The next day Slemmer began the process of putting Fort Pickens in shape, making the living spaces habitable and mounting the cannon that made up its primary armament.

Although Armstrong promised the steamer Wyandotte to assist the army, it did not arrive. Slemmer and his men labored until midnight without any help from the navy. The next day, January 10^th, Captain O. H. Berryman of the Wyandotte detached 30 seamen to help Slemmer, and the lieutenant moved all of the powder and all of the fixed ammunition for the field artillery under his command over to Fort Pickens.  That night he moved his men to the fort as well, spiking the guns at Barrancas since he had no means of moving them.

Although the Supply held provisions for Slemmer, she was not allowed to bring them to Fort Pickens on the 10^th, only a small barge-full were offloaded. However, Slemmer convinced Armstrong to allow Wyandotte and Supply to dock at Pickens the 11^th and managed to offload the much-needed provisions. He also acquired muskets and bayonets to arm the seamen still attached to his command.

On January 12, 1861 Armstrong surrendered the Pensacola Navy Yard to the State of Florida. Slemmer ordered what cannon he had mounted loaded with grape and canister and made what dispositions he could with a total garrison of only 81 men (44 artillerist privates, 4 artillerist NCOs, 31 seamen, 2 ordnance sergeants, a hospital steward, and Lieutenant Gilman, second-in-command). That afternoon a delegation led by Major Marks came to Fort Pickens and demanded its surrender. Slemmer refused.

Three days later, Colonel Chase, commanding the assembling Florida state troops, formally requested the surrender of Fort Pickens. Slemmer steadfastly refused. On the 18^th Chase tried again. The Wyandotte and Captain Berryman still cruised nearby (Supply had sailed north on the 15^th). Slemmer continued to deny Chase. With help from the Wyandotte, Slemmer even managed to mount a huge 10-inch Columbiad.

In a demonstration of how new the conflict was, once the status quo was clear, Chase allowed fresh provisions and mail to be delivered to Slemmer on a regular basis. Telegraphic exchanges with Washington were also allowed. The coming effusion of blood would soon render these amenities void for the rest of the conflict.

By February 5 Slemmer had mounted, by his report, no less than 54 cannon and had provisions and water for five months. He was opposed by almost 2,000 state troops but Chase had been unable to mount any heavy cannon to discomfit Slemmer. The next day the steamer Brooklyn arrived with reinforcements, ending any chance Chase had of taking the fort.

Lieutenant Adam J. Slemmer (from Battles and Leaders)

Slemmer’s sound judgment, quick action, and steadfastness had allowed the Union to retain the key position, essentially controlling the harbor of Pensacola. Fort Pickens would remain in Federal control for the war.

References:

Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, volume 1.

Gilman, J. H. “With Slemmer in Pensacola Harbor” in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. 1, Buel and Johnson, eds.

Lossing, Benson J. Pictorial Field Book of the Civil War, volume 1. Johns Hopkins University Press. Baltimore, MD, 1997 (reprint).